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Abstract
Many real world situations (potluck dinners, academic departments, sports teams, corporate divisions, committees, seminar
classes, etc.) involve actors adjusting their contributions in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory group goal, a win-win
result. However, the majority of human group research has involved situations where groups perform poorly because task
constraints promote either individual maximization behavior or diffusion of responsibility, and even successful tasks
generally involve the propagation of one correct solution through a group. Here we introduce a group task that requires
complementary actions among participants in order to reach a shared goal. Without communication, group members
submit numbers in an attempt to collectively sum to a randomly selected target number. After receiving group feedback,
members adjust their submitted numbers until the target number is reached. For all groups, performance improves with
task experience, and group reactivity decreases over rounds. Our empirical results provide evidence for adaptive
coordination in human groups, and as the coordination costs increase with group size, large groups adapt through
spontaneous role differentiation and self-consistency among members. We suggest several agent-based models with
different rules for agent reactions, and we show that the empirical results are best fit by a flexible, adaptive agent strategy in
which agents decrease their reactions when the group feedback changes. The task offers a simple experimental platform for
studying the general problem of group coordination while maximizing group returns, and we distinguish the task from
several games in behavioral game theory.
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Introduction
Groups often struggle to balance incentives for individual
members with incentives for the collective group. In standard
common pool resource problems [1,2], individuals are tempted to
maximize individual resources, but this behavior destroys the
resource and ultimately harms everyone. Conflicting incentives in
real world situations such as pollution and harvesting of natural
resources understandably stretch a group’s ability to coordinate for
the common good, but it is still unclear how group members
coordinate their actions in more constrained situations where only
a shared goal exists.
Humans routinely form groups to achieve goals that no
individual can accomplish alone, and presumably groups must
flexibly and adaptively coordinate members’ efforts in order to
achieve shared goals. For example, research labs rely on the
combined contributions of individuals to develop a research
program and lab reputation that leads to grant funding, which
may in turn benefit all of the lab’s researchers. Similarly, statistical
analyses in baseball and basketball increasingly value players based
on the team’s performance while the player is in the game, rather
than individual statistics such as points scored [3].
Empirical studies from social psychology and economics have
shown that group members can adequately share pieces of
information under the right circumstances [4,5], and some group
learning can occur via indirect feedback [6], but it is still unclear
how a division of labor develops to achieve a group goal. For
example, a potluck dinner ideally coordinates participants’ food
contributions so there is enough to sate everyone, without excess
left-overs that no one wants to take home. However, individuals
often make unilateral decisions about how much food to bring to
the potluck. The question then arises of how the group as a whole
can coordinate the correct amount of food to bring, with some
individuals volunteering to bring extra food to make up for other
individuals who forget to bring any food. Most readers will
recognize a similar form of coordination in committee meetings
and seminars. These situations have group goals of balanced
discussions and reasonable conclusions on a topic. Although each
member could probably propose many ideas for or against a given
topic, such exhaustive treatment is often unnecessary and even
counter-productive. Ideally, the shared goals are not sullied by
individual incentives, and people are often willing to cede the floor
if they believe the group can consequently reach an appropriate
decision with less strife or less effort. Importantly, such inactivity
need not be viewed as passivity or diffusion of responsibility,
because it can actually be a calculated decision to facilitate group
performance.
In order to isolate and test the coordination capacities of groups,
we developed a simple round-based group game called ‘‘Group
Binary Search’’ (GBS) that creates a test bed for pure coordination
without competing individual goals. In the GBS game, a computer
server randomly chooses a number between 51 and 100, and
without communication, each group member submits a guess
between 0 and 50. The computer compares the sum of
participants’ numbers to its selected number, and broadcasts the
same directional (e.g. ‘‘Too High’’) or numeric (e.g. ‘‘Too Low by
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can adjust their guesses and receive the new feedback, and the
game continues until the group correctly sums to the computer’s
number. We coined the name Group Binary Search after the
binary search algorithm in computer science [7], which searches
for a number in a sorted list by iteratively guessing the median
number in the current range of possibilities. An individual optimal
searcher can solve a binary search task in an average of log2(N)-1
trials. In our task, the answer can vary from 51 to 100, so an
individual’s average rounds to solution would be 4.64. However, in
a group binary search task, members must coordinate to reach the
shared goal.
Our GBS game shares qualities of several other tasks from game
theory and behavioral economics, but GBS uniquely tests
participants’ adaptive coordination strategies when only a shared
group goal exists. The most important distinctions include the fact
that achieving the shared group goal is also the only individual
incentive, the goal is unknown, so participants must rely on group
feedback to adjust their guesses, and complementary actions can
combine to reach the group goal. Cooperative games such as
Prisoner’s Dilemma – and more generally, public goods games –
can lead to mutual reciprocity, and coordination games such as
Battle of the Sexes [8], Leader, and the route choice game can lead
to alternating reciprocity [9,10]. In order-statistic games (the
general class that encompasses stag-hunt and weak-link games)
[8,11], each person’s payoff is affected by the minimum valued
action chosen by any member. Order-statistic games offer
opposing incentives between a payoff dominant equilibrium (if
everyone coordinates to the maximum valued action) and a risk
dominant equilibrium (individuals choose the minimum action,
which provides a decent payoff without penalizing them for others’
choices). Continental Divide games [8] reward individuals for their
guesses in relation to the median of everyone’s guesses, and a
divide separates the sub-optimal side (e.g., median guesses between
1–7 may lead individuals to a sub-optimal equilibrium at 3) from
the optimal side (e.g., median guesses between 8–14 may lead
individuals to the optimal equilibrium at 11). More naturalistic
framings of coordination allow a wide range of potentially
complementary responses, but still emphasize individual payoffs
in tasks such as group foraging [12], group path formation [13],
and spontaneous traffic lane formation [14]. In all of the
aforementioned games, everyone knows the payoff structure and
potential goals, and the emphasis is on individual actions and
incentives rather than compensatory actions that only allow
individuals to succeed if the group succeeds. Matching games do
not generally offer individuals separate incentives, but individuals
coordinate to the same items or actions by relying on the salience
of the options [15,16]. In contrast, small guesses or reactions in the
GBS game can favorably compensate for large guesses or reactions
from other members.
Other games emphasize some key elements of the GBS game.
For instance, beauty contest games [17] are relevant for their
examination of iterated reasoning, and in the GBS game, group
members can under-compensate or over-compensate for the
guesses that they think team members will make. This is akin to
the unilateral decisions that adjust how much food one brings to a
potluck dinner. The GBS game also complements coordination
games geared towards larger populations, such as minority,
majority, and business entry games. Minority [18,19] and majority
games [20] lead participants to respectively differentiate and
coordinate their strategies, and business entry games occupy a gray
area between these extremes [21]. Unlike these games, the GBS
game allows both coordination and differentiation of strategies
(substitutable or complementary strategies [22]), and it is
informative to see which types of strategies are used when
members coordinate to an unknown shared goal. Groups could
perform best when all members adopt the same strategy, or they
could perform best when members use complementary strategies.
This article presents an initial investigation of group coordination
to a shared goal using the novel GBS task.
Results
Group Coordination Results
We tested a variety of empirical questions regarding the GBS
game, including whether groups could successfully coordinate in
the task, the effects of increased information (numeric vs.
directional feedback), the effects of group size, and the strategies
and limitations of coordinating groups. As described in the
Methods section, each group completed 10 games, with successive
games alternating between numeric and directional feedback from
the server. Figure 1 shows directional feedback games from a 2-
and 17-participant group, and all game graphs for the 18 groups
are available on our website: http://cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/
GBS_graphs.zip.
For many of the analyses, we defined ‘‘small groups’’ as groups
with 2 or 3 participants, and ‘‘large groups’’ as groups with 10 or
more participants. These group sizes showed strongly contrasting
behavior, while the medium-size groups displayed a mixture of
behaviors from the two group types. Table 1 reports the average
rounds to solution for small, medium, and large groups in numeric
and directional feedback games, respectively. A 2 (Feedback:
numeric or directional)63 (Group size: small, medium, or large)
mixed groups ANOVA showed main effects for feedback and
group size. Numeric feedback games were solved significantly
faster than directional feedback games, F(1,15)=24.86, p,.001,
presumably because the numeric feedback games allow individuals
to more precisely modulate their reactions to the group feedback.
Small groups solved the games significantly faster than larger
groups, F(2,15)=25.07, p,.001, and all pairwise comparisons
between group sizes were significant. The marginal interaction
between feedback type and group size, F(2,15)=3.53, p=.055,
appears to be driven by small groups’ better utilization of numeric
feedback compared to the medium and large groups.
One can imagine large groups allowing individuals’ choices to
cancel each other out, thus coordinating to the solution more
rapidly, but instead the larger groups exhibited larger oscillations,
and small groups, with their fewer degrees of freedom and
decreased uncertainty, coordinated more quickly. All group sizes
showed similar improvement across games, with a 2.264
correlation between game number and average rounds to solution,
p,.001, and both large and small groups showed approximately
the same correlations, 2.270 and 2.273, respectively (the medium
size groups slightly lower the average). Figure 2 shows similar
improvements with practice in numeric and directional feedback
games.
Adaptive Strategies and Agent-based Models
In order to examine the consistency of behaviors among
participants, we calculated each participant’s ‘‘reactivity’’ accord-
ing to the formula (Gr –G r-1) if the group’s sum was lower than the
target number on the previous round, and (Gr-1–G r) if the group
was too high, where Gr is the participant’s guess on round r.
Groups generally underreact, as shown in Figure 3, though only
small groups significantly underreact. These results are particularly
revealing for directional feedback games, because groups react
surprisingly close to the best-fit line despite only receiving
directional information. In these cases, individuals may follow a
Group Coordination and Role Differentiation
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numeric feedback games, large magnitude feedback tempts
individuals in large groups to overreact and form outliers, but
overall, the analyses support a nuanced strategy of decreasing
reactivity over time in both feedback conditions. The average
reactivity of group members per round significantly decreases over
the last six rounds prior to solution (This method of aligning
rounds allows for greater comparability between numeric and
directional games, and small and large groups, given their different
solution times), ß=2.326, p=.001. However, a paired samples t
test for all games of all groups reveals that participants significantly
decrease their reactivities when the feedback direction changes
from one round to the next (mean decrease of 1.55), but maintain
approximately the same reactivity (mean decrease of .11) when the
feedback direction remains the same, t(148)=4.75, p,.001.
Using agent-based models, we tested several reactivity strategies.
For each model, we ran 18 groups in 10 directional feedback
games, and we matched group sizes to our empirical groups. The
source code for all models is available on our website: http://
cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/Main.txt. Each agent first sampled
from an empirically derived initial guess distribution that took into
account group size, such that there were three derived distribu-
tions, for large, small, and medium group sizes. On the second
round, agents chose a reactivity from a uniform random
distribution with a range of 0 to (50–current guess) if the group
was too low on the previous round, and from a range of
(21*current guess) to 0 if the group was too high on the previous
round. In order to maintain more realistic reactivities, we further
constrained agents to sample until they chose a reactivity within
the range 220 to +20. Model 1 and Model 2 agents continued
sampling reactivities in this fashion for every round of a game, but
Model 2 agents probabilistically decreased their sampled reactiv-
ities across rounds. On each round, each possible reactivity
number in the range 220 to +20 had a .5 probability of decreasing
by an integer chosen from the uniform random range 0 to 5. For
example, a Model 2 agent that would have chosen a +18 reactivity
in round 6 may actually increase its guess by +12, because the
chosen +18 reactivity was decreased across rounds. These random
decreases were computed separately for each group game. Models
1 and 2 constitute groups that produce reactions in a feedback-
consistent direction, and Model 2 adds the assumption that
reactions decrease over time. Models 3 and 4 replace these
random reactivity decreases with the notion of agent consistency,
Each agent sampled a reactivity on the second round, and on each
subsequent round, a Model 3 agent had a .5 probability of
decreasing its reactivity by an integer chosen from the uniform
Figure 1. Coordination in one small, 2-person group game (left) and one large, 17-person group game (right) with directional
feedback. The solid horizontal line indicates the server’s number, and the other solid line indicates the group’s sum on a given round. The dashed
lines are individual participants’ guesses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022377.g001
Table 1. Mean Rounds to Solution (and Standard Deviations)
For Different Group Sizes and Feedback Types.
Numeric feedback Directional feedback
Small groups 4.31 (.82) 6.78 (1.08)
Medium groups 8.72 (1.69) 9.78 (1.86)
Large groups 11.05 (2.99) 11.95 (1.84)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022377.t001
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reactivity when the group feedback changed (e.g. from ‘‘Too
High’’ to ‘‘Too Low’’), and otherwise maintained the same
reactivity from round to round. Thus, these models tested whether
consistent agents should simply decrease their reactivities over
time, or selectively decrease their reactivities when the feedback
changed, as our empirical results support.
Model 4 coordinated significantly faster than the other models
(means: Model 1=13.63, Model 2=12.84, Model 3=12.00,
Model 4=10.29, Empirical=10.51), p,.001 for all pairwise
model comparisons with Model 4, and was indistinguishable from
our empirical results for directional feedback games, p=.684. The
same model can solve numeric feedback games more quickly by
modifying the range of initial agent reactivities according to the
numeric feedback. Models 1, 2, and 3 were not significantly
different from each other in pairwise comparisons, which
illustrates the importance of flexible group coordination. Intui-
tively, Model 4 agents take large steps towards the goal when they
are far away, then decrease their step sizes after passing the goal.
In contrast, the approximate simulated annealing strategy [23]
from Model 3 does not efficiently span large initial-to-goal
distances unless it anneals slowly, but slow annealing results in
inefficient oscillations around the goal. We further tested this
intuition by comparing Models 3 and 4 on extended games that
could go up to 30 rounds, and the influence of unsolved games
especially hurt the average solution time for Model 3 (means:
Model 3=18.99, Model 4=14.53, p,.001).
When we tried to improve Model 3’s performance with
alternative values for the probability of reactivity decreases per
round and the size of the uniform random range, Model 3 still
converged on the target more slowly than Model 4 and our human
participants because its agents failed to adjust their reactivities
according to feedback. A detailed model comparison supported
the importance of such flexible adjustment. We ran Model 3,
Model 4, and three mixture models 10,000 times each and
computed the likelihood of the empirical data given each model’s
results. The respective mixture models followed the Model 3 policy
25%, 50%, or 75% of the time and followed the Model 4 policy
the rest of the time. All of the mixture models provided
significantly better fits for the empirical data than the constrained
Model 3 (x
2(1)=6.64, p,.01 for the 25/75 mixture model,
x
2(1)=10.74, p,.01 for the 50/50 mixture model, and
x
2(1)=15.52, p,.01 for the 75/25 mixture model. However,
none of the mixture models provided a significantly better fit for
the empirical data than Model 4, and the 25/75 mixture model
gave a significantly worse fit than Model 4, x2(1)=8.81, p,.01.
Flexible adjustment of reactivities based on feedback appears to be
a critical aspect of the coordination of empirical groups.
Groups in numeric feedback games clearly do not pursue the
expedient normative strategy in which everyone adjusts their guesses
by
Distance from Goal
Number of Players
, plus a further increment by 1 with
probability
Remainder
Number of Players
. Our analyses indicate that 26%
of numeric feedback rounds were evenly divisible for small groups,
compared with 3.2% for large groups, t(11)=2.50, p,.05.
However, for these evenly divisible rounds, participants rarely
employed the normative strategy, with an average of 14.9% of
small group members and 0% of large group members employing
the strategy on applicable rounds, t(11)=1.59, p=.14. Instead, in
conjunction with our empirical results that participants’ reactivities
decrease when the group feedback changes, our models suggest
that human groups use a flexible, adaptive strategy for group
coordination when members are uncertain about others’ actions.
Role Differentiation
The results so far have implied similar coordination mechanisms
in small and large groups, but our final analyses show striking
divergent behavior. Groups were clearly able to coordinate to
shared goals in the GBS task, but our experiences in real world
tasks (e.g. potluck dinners, committees, athletic teams, etc.) suggest
that group size has a large effect on coordination. To this end, we
calculated the variance of reactivities within individuals (Did a
participant exhibit consistent reactivities across rounds?) and
between individuals (Did all group members have similar average
reactivities?). For each of these analyses, we used groups – rather
than individuals – as the unit of analysis by averaging over the
Figure 2. For all groups, the average number of rounds needed for group coordination significantly decreases with group
experience, from the first to the fifth directional feedback game, and the first to the fifth numeric feedback game. The dashed lines
represent the best-fit. Large and small groups show similar learning trajectories in each condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022377.g002
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cantly decreases over rounds (ß=2.519, p,.001) for large groups,
but marginally increases for small groups (ß=.165, p=.083).
Similar results (ß=2.164, p,.001 for large groups, and ß=.117,
p=.057 for small groups) are obtained when the results are
analyzed at the level of individual participants rather than the
group, but such an analysis may not be ideal given the inherent
statistical dependencies among members of a group. The variance
of reactivities across members of large groups marginally increases
over games (ß=.291, p=.068), and greater variance among large
group members significantly predicts faster coordination
(ß=2.395, p=.012). In contrast, the variance of reactivities
across small group members significantly decreases over games
(ß=2.370, p,.001), and does not predict solution time. In a more
detailed analysis separately examining directional and numeric
games, the decreased variance of reactivities across small group
members is only significant for directional feedback games
(ß=2.377, p=.014), while the increased variance across large
group members achieves significance for only numeric feedback
games (ß=.485, p=.041). The average reactivity of large group
members also decreases across games (ß=2.313, p=.049), but
there is no such relationship for small groups (ß=2.04, p=.708).
Finally, on any given round, a significantly smaller proportion of
large than small group members adjust their guesses (Figure 4).
Figure 3. The Y-axis indicates groups’ reactions following a given magnitude of numeric feedback on the X-axis (top graph), or an
unknown disparity level (the group is only told ‘‘Too High’’ or ‘‘Too Low’’) in directional feedback games (bottom graph). In both
graphs, the solid line is the best-fit line for the data, indicating under-reactivity from the optimal dashed line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022377.g003
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Our results suggest that it is beneficial for members of large
groups to differentiate themselves from each other and then
maintain those roles in order to foster a predictable environment
for subsequent adjustment and coordination. Members of both
large groups and small groups react flexibly in the directional
feedback games, but small group members do not show such
restraint for quickly coordinating in the numeric feedback games.
The GBS game is much more difficult for large groups, but
increased information leads large group members to develop
specialized roles in numeric feedback games. All of the large group
members are pursuing a shared goal, but some pursue this by
adjusting their guesses, while others adopt small or zero reactivities
in order to decrease the group uncertainty. Such inactive
individuals are different than free-riders in public goods games.
Inactive participants may be intentionally helping the group in the
GBS game by decreasing the noise in the system, much like
participants in a large group meeting may restrain themselves from
talking in order to facilitate a group solution. Our analyses indicate
that large groups coordinate more quickly when group members
assume these complementary roles. Ironically, allowing altruistic
punishment [24,25] of inactive individuals could actually harm the
entire group’s performance. Members of committees and group
projects may resent individuals who do not contribute sufficiently,
but in many cases, increased contributions will delay an integrated
final decision or product.
In informal post-task interviews, large groups invariably had
many participants who stated that they stopped reacting once the
group was close to the goal, because they assumed someone else
would react, and having too many reactive people would risk
overshooting the target solution. In this respect, the GBS game is a
paradigmatic task where orderly diffusion of responsibility is a good
thing in contrast to its often tragic consequences in situations of
social helping [26]. A simple strategy for dropping-out and ceasing
to react can lead to deadlock if too many people adopt it.
Engaging in higher-order reasoning also runs risks. In each large
group, at least one person mentioned attempting to compensate
for an anticipated group overreaction by reacting in the opposite
direction when the group neared the goal. Analyses indicate that
groups would have coordinated faster without this extra
compensation.
These findings can be viewed as a preliminary investigation due
to the limited number of tested groups. After we had originally
prepared this paper, a similar game by Bavelas was brought to our
attention [27]; however, the earlier research does not appear to
have been published in a primary research outlet, and it is unclear
if more than a few groups were tested. The research only included
groups of five participants who were explicitly told what the group
sum ought to be. Bavelas found that numeric feedback leads to
worse group performance than simply indicating that the group is
wrong, but we question the replicability of that result given that
our groups consistently coordinated more quickly when they
received more informative numeric feedback.
Overall, we believe the current work introduces the GBS game
as a simple experimental paradigm that can elucidate the
mechanisms of group coordination to a shared goal that can only
be reached together, whereas Battle of the Sexes, order-statistic
games, and market entry games offer simple experimental
platforms for studying coordination of single actions and
maximization of individual returns (as well as total collective
returns). Role specialization in large groups merits further study
within the GBS framework and in ecological studies of real world
groups, and future research with the GBS task could examine the
limits of coordination and specialization as a function of task
difficulty, group history, and the role of individual incentives.
With regards to task difficulty, given our hypothesis that
differentiation develops as an adaptation to task difficulty, we
expect a lack of differentiation in a modified GBS task that only
demands coordination to an interval around the target number
(e.g. 65–75 for a target number of 70). Conversely, a more difficult
task could promote differentiation even in small groups. An
extension of the GBS game could embed participants in multiple
Figure 4. A smaller proportion of group members changes guesses as the group approaches the solution, as measured by rounds
before solution on the X-axis. Members of small groups (+s) altered their guesses on successive rounds more often than large groups (circles).
The lines are best-fit lines for small and large groups, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022377.g004
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simultaneously reach correct sums in multiple groups. Such a
version may resemble the coloring problem [28], where human
participants successfully coordinate by dynamically adjusting their
color so that no network neighbor shares the same color. The
coloring problem requires differentiation among neighbors in
order to achieve local coordination, but a similar approach to
manipulating network structure may be useful for exploring
coordination in different social structures as well as examining
adaptive team assembly mechanisms [29] and ‘‘downsizing’’
mechanisms in group coordination.
The influence of group history can be tested by changing group
composition after several games. Previous research indicates that
diversity [30] and transactive memory systems with divisions of
cognitive labor [31,32] can improve group problem-solving. The
benefits of a diverse team often outweigh the benefits of teams
culled from best-performing individuals [30]. However, diversity is
particularly helpful when group members recognize other
members’ roles [33], and group members sometimes fail to adapt
their roles to changing group conditions [34,35], which suggests
that members of our large or small groups may require significant
adjustment periods if we shift group sizes or memberships. Weber
has attempted to explain the existence of group coordination by
showing that large groups (up to 12 members) can be gradually
grown from experienced smaller groups and thereby preserve the
good performance in weak-link games [36]. However, our task
shows that group coordination can also be explained by members’
surprising abilities to specialize their roles while pursuing a shared
goal.. These results support recent modeling efforts that show the
size and composition of creative groups such as Broadway musical
writing teams and scientific research teams evolve to handle task
complexity while still minimizing coordination costs [29], but we
do not know how quickly the members will adapt to new roles.
Finally, individual incentives may have a detrimental effect
different than the one envisioned by weak-link and public goods
games. Even when participants are coordinating to a shared goal,
too much individual incentive – awarded regardless of collective
performance – may impede role specialization and group
coordination. For example, a baseball player or corporate
executive with a large contract and insufficient team performance
incentives may make little effort to coordinate with the team and
achieve the shared goal. Future GBS extensions could incorporate
individual incentives in addition to the shared goal.
Our initial investigation indicates that the GBS game is a useful
framework for testing self-organized division of labor, role
development in groups, and relations between individuals’
strategies and group-level outcomes. Many real world situations
(potluck dinners, academic departments, sports teams, corporate
divisions, committees, seminar classes, etc.) intrinsically involve
actors adjusting their contributions in order to achieve a mutually
satisfactory group goal. These tasks cannot be solved by lone
individuals, and the participation of other individuals inevitably
brings uncertainty. Our results suggest that teams of individuals
with no communication and minimal shared history automatically
adjust their roles within their group so that they coordinate
appropriately, and these results are particularly surprising given
that repeated play could easily establish norms and shared
conventions [37], rather than a spontaneous division of labor.
Future studies could test a larger number of groups with greater
control over the group sizes, and they could examine the
influences of task difficulty, group history, and individual
incentives on coordination and role specialization.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 106 undergraduate students at Indiana
University who received course credit for approximately 1 hour
of participation. All empirical research was approved by the IRB
at Indiana University, and participants were given written
informed consent and provided signatures. Participants were run
in 18 GBS experimental sessions with the following group sizes: 2,
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, 17, 17. Each group
participated in 10 games, alternating between directional feedback
games and numeric feedback games. Participants were instructed
not to talk to each other, and they were informed that there would
be a total of 10 games and they would finish the experiment more
quickly if their group quickly coordinated to the solutions.
Participants were not otherwise compensated, but in our
experience of running the experiments, participants enjoyed
successfully coordinating to the solutions. There were audible
sighs when the group narrowly missed a goal, and minor
celebrations when the group reached a goal. We did not highlight
the number of participants in a group, but that information was
available, given that all group members were simultaneously
present and visible in the computer laboratory.
Materials and Procedure
Participants sat in a university computer lab at personal
computers running the game via client Java applets connected to
a computer server. Before each game, the server randomly chose a
target number between 51 and 100. During each round, each
participant entered a guess between 0 and 50. After a 15 second
guessing period elapsed, the server compared the sum of
participants’ guesses to the group’s target number, broadcast the
same feedback to all participants’ screens, and began the next
round. Participants only knew the group sum’s relation to the
target number (e.g. ‘‘Too high’’ for directional feedback games, or
‘‘Too high by 17’’ for numeric feedback games), without knowing
the target number or the current group sum. If the participants’
guesses correctly summed to the target number, or if 15 rounds
passed unsuccessfully, then the game ended, and the next game
began after a short delay.
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